Foram encontradas 35.502 questões.
1253852
Ano: 2019
Disciplina: Inglês (Língua Inglesa)
Banca: MetroCapital
Orgão: Pref. Biritiba-Mirim-SP
Disciplina: Inglês (Língua Inglesa)
Banca: MetroCapital
Orgão: Pref. Biritiba-Mirim-SP
Provas:
Use the following text to answer the question
TEXT
Reality television is a genre of television programming which, it is claimed, presents unscripted dramatic or humorous situations, documents actual events, and features ordinary people rather than professional actors. It could be described as a form of artificial or "heightened" documentary. Although the genre has existed in some form or another since the early years of television, the current explosion of popularity dates from around 2000.
Reality television covers a wide range of television programming formats, from game or quiz shows which resemble the frantic, often demeaning programmes produced in Japan in the 1980s and 1990s (a modern example is Gaki no tsukai), to surveillance- or voyeurism- focused productions such as Big Brother.
Critics say that the term "reality television" is somewhat of a misnomer and that such shows frequently portray a modified and highly influenced form of reality, with participants put in exotic locations or abnormal situations, sometimes coached to act in certain ways by off-screen handlers, and with events on screen manipulated through editing and other post-production techniques.
Part of reality television's appeal is due to its ability to place ordinary people in extraordinary situations. For example, on the ABC show, The Bachelor, an eligible male dates a dozen women simultaneously, travelling on extraordinary dates to scenic locales. Reality television also has the potential to turn its participants into national celebrities, outwardly in talent and performance programs such as Pop Idol, though frequently Survivor and Big Brother participants also reach some degree of celebrity.
Some commentators have said that the name "reality television" is an inaccurate description for several styles of program included in the genre. In competition-based programs such as Big Brother and Survivor, and other special-living-environment shows like The Real World, the producers design the format of the show and control the day-to-day activities and the environment, creating a completely fabricated world in which the competition plays out. Producers specifically select the participants, and use carefully designed scenarios, challenges, events, and settings to encourage particular behaviours and conflicts. Mark Burnett, creator of Survivor and other reality shows, has agreed with this assessment, and avoids the word "reality" to describe his shows; he has said, "I tell good stories. It really is not reality TV. It really is unscripted drama."
Reality TV appeals to some because:
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
What does the word nationalist mean? (Part II)
It's also a word that means different things to different people. "There are different definitions depending on whose nationalism you're talking about," Paul D. Miller, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, told CNN.
"Scholars generally differentiate between civic and ethnic/sectarian nationalism, that is, between rooting American identity in the ideals of the American experiment versus rooting it in some aspect of our culture, heritage, history, language or ethnicity. Civic nationalism is the same as what I would call patriotism, and it is essential to a healthy democracy. The second kind of nationalism -- sectarian nationalism -- is pernicious and dangerous."
But Raheem Kassam, a former senior adviser to Brexit leader Nigel Farage, rejects this second, more negative definition of nationalist.
"Nationalism is not inherently ugly. It is in fact inherently beautiful," said Kassam, who is currently a fellow at the Middle East Forum.
"Nationalism is a philosophy based around either the nation state, what we know colloquially as 'countries,' or around another identity factor, which could be religion, ethnicity, geography or even interests," he told CNN.
"In the case of President Trump, he is no doubt using the word to outline his belief in a nation of people unified by beliefs, interests and a common history. This is typically what nationalism has meant since the earliest references to it in human history, though there have no doubt been periods where nationalism, just like socialism or other philosophies, has been used to divide rather than unite, which is ironically the antithesis of its purpose."
From: shorturl.at/kmOR1 Accessed on 08/28/2019
(URCA/2020.1) No texto, quem não defende uma visão negativa da palavra nacionalista?
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Brazil: Neoliberalism versus Democracy
Alfredo Saad Filho & Lecio Morais; 2018 by Pluto Press
Neoliberalism in Brazil
Neoliberalism is more than an ideology or a clearly defined set of policies, for example, privatisation, the liberalisation of trade and finance, or curbs to the welfare state. In what follows, neoliberalism is conceptualised as the dominant system of accumulation [SoA] today […]. This SoA has four distinguishing features: the financialisation of production, ideology and the state; the international integration of production (‘globalisation’); a prominent role for foreign capital for globally integrated production and the stabilisation of the balance of payments, and a macroeconomic policy mix based on contractionary fiscal and monetary policies and inflation targeting, with the manipulation of interest rates becoming the main policy tool. This combination of features has raised the rate of exploitation above that achieved under the previous SoAs, for example, Keynesianism in the advanced Western economies, different forms of developmentalism in the Global South, or Soviet-style socialism in Eastern Europe.
In most countries, the first (transition or shock) phase of neoliberalism normally forefronts the narrow interests of transnationalised private capital and, especially, finance, without regard to the consequences. This phase involves forceful state intervention to impose the new institutional framework and an accumulation strategy promoting the transnational integration of domestic capital at the microeconomic (firm) level, containing labour and disorganising the left. This is normally followed by a second (mature) phase, which aims to consolidate the expanded role of finance in economic and social reproduction, manage the new mode of international integration, stabilise the social relations imposed in the previous phase, nurture a neoliberal subjectivity, and introduce neoliberal social policies to manage mass economic deprivation.
These phases and the ensuing accumulation strategies are, inevitably, framed more logically than chronologically. They can be sequenced, delayed, accelerated, or even overlain in specific ways depending on country, region and economic and political circumstances. However, both phases require extensive (re-)regulation of economic and social reproduction, with political implications, despite the rhetorical insistence of all manner of neoliberals on the need to ‘roll back’ the state, interpreted, in the first phase of neoliberalism, as ‘hollowing out’, followed by the ‘rolling out’ of new forms of intervention, typically in the second phase.
Across its phases, the neoliberal reforms transform the material foundations of the economy, society and social reproduction, with implications for class relations and the distributional balance between them. This includes policies to dismantle the previous SoA (which is invariably defined as being ‘inefficient’), the reduction of the scope for state-led coordination of economic activity, the limitation of collective bargaining and wage growth, and the creation of undesirable patterns of employment […]. These changes feed the concentration of income and wealth, preclude the use of industrial policy tools to achieve socially determined priorities, and make the balance of payments structurally dependent on international flows of capital. Neoliberalism also influences social relations through the financialisation of social reproduction and the privatisation of the commons, that is, areas where property rights were either absent or vested upon the state.
In Brazil, the political transition to democracy was followed by the economic transition from an increasingly dysfunctional ISI [Import Substitution Industrialization] into a globalised and financialised neoliberalism. The Brazilian economic transition came relatively late and advanced slowly when compared with other countries in Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe. This was due, in part, to the strong political left that emerged during the democratic transition, which drastically limited the scope for the neoliberal reforms. Brazil’s unique path to neoliberalism was also shaped by the imperative of inflation stabilisation.
During the 1980s, most analysts came to accept that ISI faced four insuperable challenges that, presumably, explained Brazil’s disappointing economic performance, inflation and external vulnerability. First, the inefficiency of the financial sector, that was unwilling or unable to channel savings to long-term investment projects. Second, insufficient access to foreign savings, investment, technology and markets. Third, continuing industrial backwardness, because of the weakness of the national system of innovation, excessive diversification, lack of scale in manufacturing production, and lack of foreign competition due to protectionism. Fourth, the fiscal crisis and the tendency towards hyperinflation, that were caused by ‘economic populism’, distributive conflicts and widespread indexation of wages and prices.
Supposedly, these obstacles could be overcome only by an accumulation strategy restoring rapid capital accumulation and ‘modernising’ the economy and society. This would require ‘rolling back’ the state through expenditure cuts, extensive privatisations, liberalisation of trade, finance and capital flows, and reforms of the fiscal, tax and social security systems. The fiscal reforms should reduce inflation; financial liberalisation would increase domestic savings and investment, and import liberalisation would cheapen inputs, increase the availability of quality consumer goods and reduce the monopoly power of inefficient producers and greedy trade unions. Finally, the liberalisation of capital movements would attract direct and portfolio inflows to fund economic restructuring. These policy reforms would raise productivity and improve the balance of payments. Economic liberalisation and the integration of Brazilian capital into transnational conglomerates would drive a virtuous circle of growth turning Brazil into a developed economy. This strategic shift was supported by strong pressures from the US government, the international financial institutions, the media and foreign and Brazilian capital, and validated by claims of success of comparable countries, especially Argentina, Mexico and South Korea.
From the text:
Item 2 - Brazil would enter into a vicious circle in this new SoA;
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Based on your interpretation of the following text, determine whether each statement it is right or wrong.
Is modern monetary theory nutty or essential?
Some eminent economists think the former
Print edition | Finance and economics
Mar 14th 2019
“Modern monetary theory” [MMT] sounds like the subject of a lecture destined to put undergraduates to sleep. But among macroeconomists MMT is far from soporific. Stephanie Kelton, a leading MMT scholar at Stony Brook University, has advised Bernie Sanders, a senator and presidential candidate. Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, a young flag-bearer of the American left, cites MMT when asked how she plans to pay for a Green New Deal. As MMT’s political stock has risen, so has the temperature of debate about it. Paul Krugman, a Nobel prizewinner and newspaper columnist, recently complained that its devotees engage in “Calvinball” (a game in the comic strip “Calvin and Hobbes” in which players may change the rules on a whim). Larry Summers, a former treasury secretary now at Harvard University, recently called MMT the new “voodoo economics”, an insult formerly reserved for the notion that tax cuts pay for themselves. These arguments are loud, sprawling and difficult to weigh up. They also speak volumes about macroeconomics.
MMT has its roots in deep doctrinal fissures. In the decades after the Depression economists argued, sometimes bitterly, over how to build on the ideas of John Maynard Keynes, macroeconomics’ founding intellect. In the end, a mathematised, American strain of Keynesianism became dominant, while other variants were lumped into the category of “post-Keynesianism”: an eclectic mix of ideas consigned to the heterodox fringe. In the 1990s a number of like-minded thinkers drew on post-Keynesian ideas in fleshing out the perspective embodied in MMT.
That perspective is not always clear; there is no canonical MMT model. But there are some central ideas. A government that prints and borrows in its own currency cannot be forced to default, since it can always create money to pay creditors. New money can also pay for government spending; tax revenues are unnecessary. Governments, furthermore, should use their budgets to manage demand and maintain full employment (tasks now assigned to monetary policy, set by central banks). The main constraint on government spending is not the mood of the bond market, but the availability of underused resources, like jobless workers. Raising spending when the economy is already at full capacity can lead to rapid inflation. The purpose of taxes, then, is to keep inflation in check. Spending is the accelerator, taxation the brakes. Fiscal deficits are irrelevant as long as unemployment is low and prices are stable.
To those versed in orthodoxy — in which governments must eventually pay for their spending through taxes — these ideas sound bizarre. This strangeness is partly a result of MMT scholars’ unconventional idiom. Speaking with MMT’s adherents is sometimes like watching a football match with friends who insist the ball remains stationary while every other element in the game, including the pitch and goalposts, moves around it. Communication is made harder still by mmters’ sparse use of mathematical models. To economists who consider heavy-duty maths a mark of seriousness, such reluctance to use equations is either evidence of intellectual inferiority or a way of avoiding scrutiny.
It may instead reflect the fact that MMT is less a rival theory than a qualitative critique. Yes, central banks can use interest rates to achieve full employment, if rates are not too close to zero. But mmters think governments are better equipped. Monetary policy works via banks and financial markets, but when markets panic, this mechanism is weakened. Rate cuts stimulate the economy by encouraging firms and households to borrow, but that can engender risky levels of private-sector debt. Government spending sidesteps these problems. Similarly, rate rises can slow inflation. But they often work by inducing indiscriminate involuntary unemployment. The state could instead tame an unruly boom, mmters argue, by breaking up monopolies — thus loosening supply constraints — or by aiming tax increases at fossil-fuel firms.
Economists recognise that their models have shortcomings, and that monetary policy is not all-powerful. But most economists have long held that macroeconomic policy should stabilise the economy with the lightest possible touch, the better to let markets allocate resources. Other means can then be used to tackle reckless lending, market failures or inequality. MMT’s supporters question this — and believe that recent economic history bolsters their case.
You might suppose that the feud could be settled by testing rival claims. Alas, macroeconomics rarely works this way. Macroeconomists cannot run experiments as laboratory scientists can. Statistical analysis of the world is muddied by the vast number of variables, many of which are correlated with the thing whose effect the economist is trying to isolate. Macroeconomic arguments tend not to produce winners and losers: only those with more influence and those with less. Post-Keynesian ideas were never proven false, unlike the Ptolemaic model of the solar system. Rather, they declined in status as mainstream Keynesianism rose.
Stupor models
Mainstream Keynesianism was tarnished in turn amid the inflation of the 1970s. The monetarism which then gained favour floundered a decade later, when central banks targeting money-supply growth discovered that the link between their targets and inflation had vanished. Keynesians regrouped and built “new Keynesian” models which became the workhorses of much recent analysis. They too have disappointed. In 2016 Olivier Blanchard, a former chief economist of the IMF, described the workhorses as “seriously flawed”, “based on unappealing assumptions”, and yielding implications that are “not convincing”. Paul Romer, a Nobel laureate last year, wrote in 2016 that “for more than three decades, macroeconomics has gone backwards”.
MMT is not obviously a step forward. But if it wins political support and influences policy only to flop, that is hardly voodoo. It is macroeconomics as usual.
This article appeared in the Finance and economics section of the print edition under the headline “Magic or logic?”
MMT argues that:
Item 0 - Governments can print their own money in order to boost economic growth;
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
America is one of 6 countries that make up more than half of gun deaths worldwide (Part II)
A new study puts the US’s gun problem in a global perspective. It’s really bad. America was also the odd country out among wealthier nations when it comes to gun deaths. For comparison, the US’s rate of 10.6 gun deaths per 100,000 people was much higher than Switzerland’s rate of 2.8, Canada’s 2.1, Germany’s 0.9, the United Kingdom’s 0.3, and Japan’s 0.2. It is expected that as countries become wealthier and build stronger government institutions, they will see fewer gun deaths (since systemic poverty and weak criminal justice systems, for example, can contribute to more violence. While the rate of US gun deaths is lower than that of many less developed countries, America is still an outlier when compared to nations in similar socioeconomic circumstances. The study’s estimates are not perfect, as some countries do a poor job tracking gun deaths and proxy measures that are used to gauge gun deaths. But the study gives us the best look yet into gun deaths worldwide — and it’s not good for America. A major reason is the US’s tremendous number of guns and weak gun laws. Time and time again, researchers have linked these factors to America’s high rates of gun violence, making it the most violent developed country in the world when it comes to guns.
From: https://www.vox.com/2018/8/29/17792776/us-gun-deaths-global. Accessed on 05/10/2019
De acordo com o texto, por que os Estados Unidos não deveriam constar nessa lista de países com maior número de mortes por armas?
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Based on your interpretation of the following text, determine whether each statement it is right or wrong.
Is modern monetary theory nutty or essential?
Some eminent economists think the former
Print edition | Finance and economics
Mar 14th 2019
“Modern monetary theory” [MMT] sounds like the subject of a lecture destined to put undergraduates to sleep. But among macroeconomists MMT is far from soporific. Stephanie Kelton, a leading MMT scholar at Stony Brook University, has advised Bernie Sanders, a senator and presidential candidate. Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, a young flag-bearer of the American left, cites MMT when asked how she plans to pay for a Green New Deal. As MMT’s political stock has risen, so has the temperature of debate about it. Paul Krugman, a Nobel prizewinner and newspaper columnist, recently complained that its devotees engage in “Calvinball” (a game in the comic strip “Calvin and Hobbes” in which players may change the rules on a whim). Larry Summers, a former treasury secretary now at Harvard University, recently called MMT the new “voodoo economics”, an insult formerly reserved for the notion that tax cuts pay for themselves. These arguments are loud, sprawling and difficult to weigh up. They also speak volumes about macroeconomics.
MMT has its roots in deep doctrinal fissures. In the decades after the Depression economists argued, sometimes bitterly, over how to build on the ideas of John Maynard Keynes, macroeconomics’ founding intellect. In the end, a mathematised, American strain of Keynesianism became dominant, while other variants were lumped into the category of “post-Keynesianism”: an eclectic mix of ideas consigned to the heterodox fringe. In the 1990s a number of like-minded thinkers drew on post-Keynesian ideas in fleshing out the perspective embodied in MMT.
That perspective is not always clear; there is no canonical MMT model. But there are some central ideas. A government that prints and borrows in its own currency cannot be forced to default, since it can always create money to pay creditors. New money can also pay for government spending; tax revenues are unnecessary. Governments, furthermore, should use their budgets to manage demand and maintain full employment (tasks now assigned to monetary policy, set by central banks). The main constraint on government spending is not the mood of the bond market, but the availability of underused resources, like jobless workers. Raising spending when the economy is already at full capacity can lead to rapid inflation. The purpose of taxes, then, is to keep inflation in check. Spending is the accelerator, taxation the brakes. Fiscal deficits are irrelevant as long as unemployment is low and prices are stable.
To those versed in orthodoxy — in which governments must eventually pay for their spending through taxes — these ideas sound bizarre. This strangeness is partly a result of MMT scholars’ unconventional idiom. Speaking with MMT’s adherents is sometimes like watching a football match with friends who insist the ball remains stationary while every other element in the game, including the pitch and goalposts, moves around it. Communication is made harder still by mmters’ sparse use of mathematical models. To economists who consider heavy-duty maths a mark of seriousness, such reluctance to use equations is either evidence of intellectual inferiority or a way of avoiding scrutiny.
It may instead reflect the fact that MMT is less a rival theory than a qualitative critique. Yes, central banks can use interest rates to achieve full employment, if rates are not too close to zero. But mmters think governments are better equipped. Monetary policy works via banks and financial markets, but when markets panic, this mechanism is weakened. Rate cuts stimulate the economy by encouraging firms and households to borrow, but that can engender risky levels of private-sector debt. Government spending sidesteps these problems. Similarly, rate rises can slow inflation. But they often work by inducing indiscriminate involuntary unemployment. The state could instead tame an unruly boom, mmters argue, by breaking up monopolies — thus loosening supply constraints — or by aiming tax increases at fossil-fuel firms.
Economists recognise that their models have shortcomings, and that monetary policy is not all-powerful. But most economists have long held that macroeconomic policy should stabilise the economy with the lightest possible touch, the better to let markets allocate resources. Other means can then be used to tackle reckless lending, market failures or inequality. MMT’s supporters question this — and believe that recent economic history bolsters their case.
You might suppose that the feud could be settled by testing rival claims. Alas, macroeconomics rarely works this way. Macroeconomists cannot run experiments as laboratory scientists can. Statistical analysis of the world is muddied by the vast number of variables, many of which are correlated with the thing whose effect the economist is trying to isolate. Macroeconomic arguments tend not to produce winners and losers: only those with more influence and those with less. Post-Keynesian ideas were never proven false, unlike the Ptolemaic model of the solar system. Rather, they declined in status as mainstream Keynesianism rose.
Stupor models
Mainstream Keynesianism was tarnished in turn amid the inflation of the 1970s. The monetarism which then gained favour floundered a decade later, when central banks targeting money-supply growth discovered that the link between their targets and inflation had vanished. Keynesians regrouped and built “new Keynesian” models which became the workhorses of much recent analysis. They too have disappointed. In 2016 Olivier Blanchard, a former chief economist of the IMF, described the workhorses as “seriously flawed”, “based on unappealing assumptions”, and yielding implications that are “not convincing”. Paul Romer, a Nobel laureate last year, wrote in 2016 that “for more than three decades, macroeconomics has gone backwards”.
MMT is not obviously a step forward. But if it wins political support and influences policy only to flop, that is hardly voodoo. It is macroeconomics as usual.
This article appeared in the Finance and economics section of the print edition under the headline “Magic or logic?”
According to the text, “Modern Monetary Theory (MMT)”:
Item 2 - has unanimously been defended;
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Match the columns relating the sentences with the correct classification:
First column: Classification
1- Comparative Adjective
2- Superlative Adjective
3- Phrasal Verb
4- Reflexive Pronoun
5- Reported Speech
Second column: Sentences
( ) Why would you run away from this test?
( ) I told Mark that I didn’t have any money.
( ) The situation is even harder than I thought.
( ) The film itself wasn’t very good, but I loved the music.
( ) She is the sweetest person I have ever met.
Choose the alternative that presents the correct match:
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
America is one of 6 countries that make up more than half of gun deaths worldwide (Part I)
A new study puts the US’s gun problem in a global perspective. It’s really bad.
Out of the world’s 251,000 gun deaths every year, there’s a group of six countries that make up more than half of those deaths — and the United States is in it, according to a new study published in JAMA.
The five other countries are Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Guatemala, which have differing problems, but generally have much weaker economies and institutions — particularly criminal justice systems — than America. No other developed nation comes close to the death toll these other countries face to gun violence, which, for the purposes of this study, excludes deaths from war, terrorism, executions, and police.
The top six’s gun death tolls for 2016: Brazil was 43,200, the US 37,200, Mexico 15,400, Colombia 13,300, Venezuela 12,800, and Guatemala 5,090. Collectively, these countries made up less than 10 percent of the global population but 50.5 percent of the world’s gun deaths, the study found.
From: https://www.vox.com/2018/8/29/17792776/us-gun-deaths-global. Accessed on 05/10/2019
Foram considerados nesse estudo:
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Brazil: Neoliberalism versus Democracy
Alfredo Saad Filho & Lecio Morais; 2018 by Pluto Press
Neoliberalism in Brazil
Neoliberalism is more than an ideology or a clearly defined set of policies, for example, privatisation, the liberalisation of trade and finance, or curbs to the welfare state. In what follows, neoliberalism is conceptualised as the dominant system of accumulation [SoA] today […]. This SoA has four distinguishing features: the financialisation of production, ideology and the state; the international integration of production (‘globalisation’); a prominent role for foreign capital for globally integrated production and the stabilisation of the balance of payments, and a macroeconomic policy mix based on contractionary fiscal and monetary policies and inflation targeting, with the manipulation of interest rates becoming the main policy tool. This combination of features has raised the rate of exploitation above that achieved under the previous SoAs, for example, Keynesianism in the advanced Western economies, different forms of developmentalism in the Global South, or Soviet-style socialism in Eastern Europe.
In most countries, the first (transition or shock) phase of neoliberalism normally forefronts the narrow interests of transnationalised private capital and, especially, finance, without regard to the consequences. This phase involves forceful state intervention to impose the new institutional framework and an accumulation strategy promoting the transnational integration of domestic capital at the microeconomic (firm) level, containing labour and disorganising the left. This is normally followed by a second (mature) phase, which aims to consolidate the expanded role of finance in economic and social reproduction, manage the new mode of international integration, stabilise the social relations imposed in the previous phase, nurture a neoliberal subjectivity, and introduce neoliberal social policies to manage mass economic deprivation.
These phases and the ensuing accumulation strategies are, inevitably, framed more logically than chronologically. They can be sequenced, delayed, accelerated, or even overlain in specific ways depending on country, region and economic and political circumstances. However, both phases require extensive (re-)regulation of economic and social reproduction, with political implications, despite the rhetorical insistence of all manner of neoliberals on the need to ‘roll back’ the state, interpreted, in the first phase of neoliberalism, as ‘hollowing out’, followed by the ‘rolling out’ of new forms of intervention, typically in the second phase.
Across its phases, the neoliberal reforms transform the material foundations of the economy, society and social reproduction, with implications for class relations and the distributional balance between them. This includes policies to dismantle the previous SoA (which is invariably defined as being ‘inefficient’), the reduction of the scope for state-led coordination of economic activity, the limitation of collective bargaining and wage growth, and the creation of undesirable patterns of employment […]. These changes feed the concentration of income and wealth, preclude the use of industrial policy tools to achieve socially determined priorities, and make the balance of payments structurally dependent on international flows of capital. Neoliberalism also influences social relations through the financialisation of social reproduction and the privatisation of the commons, that is, areas where property rights were either absent or vested upon the state.
In Brazil, the political transition to democracy was followed by the economic transition from an increasingly dysfunctional ISI [Import Substitution Industrialization] into a globalised and financialised neoliberalism. The Brazilian economic transition came relatively late and advanced slowly when compared with other countries in Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe. This was due, in part, to the strong political left that emerged during the democratic transition, which drastically limited the scope for the neoliberal reforms. Brazil’s unique path to neoliberalism was also shaped by the imperative of inflation stabilisation.
During the 1980s, most analysts came to accept that ISI faced four insuperable challenges that, presumably, explained Brazil’s disappointing economic performance, inflation and external vulnerability. First, the inefficiency of the financial sector, that was unwilling or unable to channel savings to long-term investment projects. Second, insufficient access to foreign savings, investment, technology and markets. Third, continuing industrial backwardness, because of the weakness of the national system of innovation, excessive diversification, lack of scale in manufacturing production, and lack of foreign competition due to protectionism. Fourth, the fiscal crisis and the tendency towards hyperinflation, that were caused by ‘economic populism’, distributive conflicts and widespread indexation of wages and prices.
Supposedly, these obstacles could be overcome only by an accumulation strategy restoring rapid capital accumulation and ‘modernising’ the economy and society. This would require ‘rolling back’ the state through expenditure cuts, extensive privatisations, liberalisation of trade, finance and capital flows, and reforms of the fiscal, tax and social security systems. The fiscal reforms should reduce inflation; financial liberalisation would increase domestic savings and investment, and import liberalisation would cheapen inputs, increase the availability of quality consumer goods and reduce the monopoly power of inefficient producers and greedy trade unions. Finally, the liberalisation of capital movements would attract direct and portfolio inflows to fund economic restructuring. These policy reforms would raise productivity and improve the balance of payments. Economic liberalisation and the integration of Brazilian capital into transnational conglomerates would drive a virtuous circle of growth turning Brazil into a developed economy. This strategic shift was supported by strong pressures from the US government, the international financial institutions, the media and foreign and Brazilian capital, and validated by claims of success of comparable countries, especially Argentina, Mexico and South Korea.
The text let us know that domestically during the 1980s:
Item 2 - The financial sector was not financing long term investments;
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
What does the word nationalist mean? (Part II)
It's also a word that means different things to different people. "There are different definitions depending on whose nationalism you're talking about," Paul D. Miller, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, told CNN.
"Scholars generally differentiate between civic and ethnic/sectarian nationalism, that is, between rooting American identity in the ideals of the American experiment versus rooting it in some aspect of our culture, heritage, history, language or ethnicity. Civic nationalism is the same as what I would call patriotism, and it is essential to a healthy democracy. The second kind of nationalism -- sectarian nationalism -- is pernicious and dangerous."
But Raheem Kassam, a former senior adviser to Brexit leader Nigel Farage, rejects this second, more negative definition of nationalist.
"Nationalism is not inherently ugly. It is in fact inherently beautiful," said Kassam, who is currently a fellow at the Middle East Forum.
"Nationalism is a philosophy based around either the nation state, what we know colloquially as 'countries,' or around another identity factor, which could be religion, ethnicity, geography or even interests," he told CNN.
"In the case of President Trump, he is no doubt using the word to outline his belief in a nation of people unified by beliefs, interests and a common history. This is typically what nationalism has meant since the earliest references to it in human history, though there have no doubt been periods where nationalism, just like socialism or other philosophies, has been used to divide rather than unite, which is ironically the antithesis of its purpose."
From: shorturl.at/kmOR1 Accessed on 08/28/2019
(URCA/2020.1) O texto defende que a palavra nacionalista
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Cadernos
Caderno Container