Magna Concursos

Foram encontradas 110 questões.

3006749 Ano: 2006
Disciplina: TI - Banco de Dados
Banca: FCC
Orgão: BACEN

Um processo que tem comandos SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE ou DELETE, para o controle de concorrência, requer, respectivamente, locks

 

Provas

Questão presente nas seguintes provas
3006748 Ano: 2006
Disciplina: TI - Banco de Dados
Banca: FCC
Orgão: BACEN
Sobre definição e manipulação de visão, analise:
I. Na criação de uma VIEW pode-se utilizar UNION e ORDER BY.

II. Uma VIEW provê mais segurança, pois permite esconder parte dos dados da tabela real.

III. Os dados que compõem a VIEW são armazenados separadamente da tabela real.

IV. Uma linha inserida na VIEW, com todas as colunas, será inserida na tabela real.

V. Se contiver as cláusulas JOIN e GROUP BY, uma VIEW só poderá ser usada para SELECT.
É correto o que consta APENAS em
 

Provas

Questão presente nas seguintes provas
3006747 Ano: 2006
Disciplina: TI - Banco de Dados
Banca: FCC
Orgão: BACEN

Os usuários finais e os programadores de aplicações interagem com um banco de dados por meio de uma

 

Provas

Questão presente nas seguintes provas
3006746 Ano: 2006
Disciplina: TI - Banco de Dados
Banca: FCC
Orgão: BACEN

A arquitetura de sistemas de bancos de dados ANSI/SPARC se divide em 3 níveis, na qual o nível interno

 

Provas

Questão presente nas seguintes provas
3006745 Ano: 2006
Disciplina: TI - Banco de Dados
Banca: FCC
Orgão: BACEN

O endereço de um registro colocado no banco de dados, cujo valor é calculado em função de algum campo do próprio registro, caracteriza

 

Provas

Questão presente nas seguintes provas
3006744 Ano: 2006
Disciplina: TI - Banco de Dados
Banca: FCC
Orgão: BACEN

O estabelecimento de conexão entre um aplicativo Java e um banco de dados, para processar instruções SQL de consulta e atualização, é possibilitado por meio do padrão aberto, desenvolvido pela Microsoft, denominado

 

Provas

Questão presente nas seguintes provas

The Internet at Risk


Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over the assignment of Web site addresses (for example, http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for example, johndoe@aol.com). The delegates' argument is that unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why should the United States continue to control the registration of French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's historic role in democratizing travel was.

The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that 51...

The job of assigning domain names offers huge opportunities for abuse. 52... controls this function can decide to keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline (dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not occurred.

It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.

Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would be caught between the different visions of its members: on the one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side, open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently political.

You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so. But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China. The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest control of the Internet from the United States, because they already have it.

(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)

No geral, o texto
 

Provas

Questão presente nas seguintes provas

The Internet at Risk


Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over the assignment of Web site addresses (for example, http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for example, johndoe@aol.com). The delegates' argument is that unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why should the United States continue to control the registration of French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's historic role in democratizing travel was.

The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that 51...

The job of assigning domain names offers huge opportunities for abuse. 52... controls this function can decide to keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline (dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not occurred.

It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.

Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would be caught between the different visions of its members: on the one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side, open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently political.

You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so. But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China. The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest control of the Internet from the United States, because they already have it.

(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)


O pronome it, no final do texto, refere-se a
 

Provas

Questão presente nas seguintes provas

The Internet at Risk


Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over the assignment of Web site addresses (for example, http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for example, johndoe@aol.com). The delegates' argument is that unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why should the United States continue to control the registration of French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's historic role in democratizing travel was.

The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that 51...

The job of assigning domain names offers huge opportunities for abuse. 52... controls this function can decide to keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline (dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not occurred.

It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.

Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would be caught between the different visions of its members: on the one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side, open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently political.

You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so. But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China. The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest control of the Internet from the United States, because they already have it.

(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)


Segundo o texto, a escolha de um órgão supervisor multilateral da Internet poderia tornar o registro de domínio
 

Provas

Questão presente nas seguintes provas

The Internet at Risk


Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over the assignment of Web site addresses (for example, http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for example, johndoe@aol.com). The delegates' argument is that unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why should the United States continue to control the registration of French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's historic role in democratizing travel was.

The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that 51...

The job of assigning domain names offers huge opportunities for abuse. 52... controls this function can decide to keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline (dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not occurred.

It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.

Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would be caught between the different visions of its members: on the one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side, open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently political.

You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so. But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China. The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest control of the Internet from the United States, because they already have it.

(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)


In the third paragraph, such abuses have not occurred means that
 

Provas

Questão presente nas seguintes provas